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Security and Risk Assessment: Black box Modeling, Taxonomy and Systematic Literature 
Review 
LALEH PIRZADEH 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
Chalmers University of Technology 
ABSTRACT	
 
In order to successfully perform and manage any type of project, there is a need to identify 
and assess the key factors that have an effect on the project's performance and its 
deliverables. Security and risk are two important concepts in contemporary information 
system industry that need to be assessed and addressed. Unfortunately, there exists no clear 
overall view of the key factors that are involved in the security and risk assessment processes. 
 
This thesis attempts to highlight the effect of system attributes and operation on security and 
risk assessment. Moreover, due to criticality of risk assessment in both information system 
and software development projects, the thesis attempts to clarify the assessment process by 
identifying and categorizing existing approaches and investigating their difference. To that 
end, the thesis proposes a structured approach for assessment and metrication of operational 
security that is based on black box modeling for categorizing security metrics as being 
protective or behavioral, and integrity metrics as being system-related or threat-related. The 
thesis also proposes a novel factor for improving reliability of security risk calculation and 
analysis by taking system operational factors into account. Another contribution of the thesis 
is taxonomy for the risk assessment process in which key players and phases in the risk 
assessment process are identified. Finally, different risk management strategies among 
various software development processes are investigated to identify potential advantages of 
one to the other.   
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	1.	INTRODUCTION	
The growth of information systems is progressively simplifying our daily lives. At the same 
time these systems have become increasingly complex. In the past, the most important 
concern with mechanical and computer-based system was to ensure their reliability during 
operation. Such a concern draws more attention to specific attributes of computer and 
communication based systems such as dependability, reliability, functionality, and safety. 
These attributes define the level at which a system can handle an operation without failing 
with disastrous consequences. However contemporary computer-based systems are yet more 
complicated in the sense that they must handle the occurrence of system failure of different 
nature than the random failures. Accordingly, other attributes such as security, privacy and 
risk have become important to ensure successful business and economic decisions in industry.  
For business an additional critical aspect is risk management. In order to manage risk, it is 
crucial to conduct preventive work for information security throughout society. Further, to be 
able to manage the organizations, managers need to make economic decisions on daily basis, 
be it spending money on specific security matters, prioritizing different tasks, or deciding on 
an acceptable risk level. Additionally, in order to control and manage information systems, 
regardless of their properties, it is of value to have knowledge about system performance in 
both normal and hostile environments. Information system assessment could enhance the 
process of gathering such information by providing an overview of system security and 
dependability, operating and defense mechanisms, system vulnerabilities and strength. 
To get a profound understanding of information systems operation in hostile environments, 
there is a need to conduct operational security and risk assessment. The assessment process 
can be either qualitative (expert-based) or be based on quantitative metrication of security and 
risk. Accordingly, the assessment process results in qualitative or quantitative measures, 
which are beneficial for designers when choosing among different security features in order 
to reduce risk of system failure when system vulnerability is targeted by threats. Furthermore, 
information system security and risk assessment enhances managers’ decisions on whether to 
invest money on improving security to avoid monetary consequences or to accept the risk of 
security breaches and system failures.  
The objective of this thesis is to provide an insight into the process of security and risk 
assessment, when used in various settings. Identifying different system attributes becomes 
more complicated when the system boundaries are not clear [1]. Since this thesis addresses 
different aspects of information systems, it is necessary to understand the use of different 
terminologies when investigating different contexts. To that end, the thesis focuses on two 
particular system aspects. First we present a study of operational security and risk assessment 
in information systems in general, taking a black box approach. We then present an 
investigation of risk assessment and management in a more special setting, namely the 
software development process. 
We consider these two system aspects, information system in general and software 
development process in particular, due to the fact that terminologies often differ completely 
when investigated in different contexts, which is the case with risk in relation to system 
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security vs. the concept of risk in different projects such as development of software. The first 
definition for risk refers to risk of threats attacking the system of interest and causing 
alteration of system behavior such as compromised confidentiality or availability. The latter 
definition refers to risk of project failure in terms of budget shortcomings or missing 
scheduled deadlines. However, sometimes the terminologies are convergent or overlapping, 
which is the case for security and dependability as well as for dependability and trust. For the 
purpose of this thesis we therefore present a clear terminology for such attributes. In the 
following subsection, we summarize common definition for dependability, security and risk. 
As this thesis addresses risk in two different contexts, we will provide a short description of 
risk management and assessment within information systems, on the one hand, and software 
development projects, on the other hand. 
To summarize, the main problem this thesis strives to address is the lack of clarity and 
consistency regarding definitions and terminologies, as well as an overall view of key factors 
that are involved in the security and risk assessment process. To that end the thesis starts by 
proposing a categorization of a set of attributes to be applied as metrics for quantifying 
operational system security. Moreover, by highlighting system operation and the internal 
mechanisms effect on system output, we suggest a new metric for calculating risk probability. 
Further, we propose a taxonomy that clarifies the resources, inputs, evaluation method and 
outputs involved in the qualitative and quantitative risk assessment process. To provide a 
wider vie, we investigate how risk is assessed and managed in a bigger and more concrete 
setting, i.e., software development. 
In the following sections the key attributes in this thesis, i.e. dependability, security and risk, 
are defined. A short history of the origins of the attributes is provided in Section 1.1. The 
context within which the attributes are applied is established in Section 1.2.  
1.1	DEPENDABILITY,	SECURITY	AND	RISK	-----	DEFINITION	AND	HISTORY	
Dependability is one of the oldest operational attributes of a system. It is used to identify the 
service delivered or in other words the behavior of a system in normal and faulty 
environments. A committee on “Fundamental Concepts and Terminology” first addressed the 
dependability concept back in 1980 [1]. This was followed by seven position papers leading 
to a book on the concepts and terminology [2]. Dependability was defined as “the ability to 
deliver service that can be justifiably trusted” [1]. The same authors proposed an alternative 
definition, as “the ability of a system to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more 
severe than is acceptable” [1]. The concept was composed of several attributes, each shortly 
described below [1].	
• Availability refers to system readiness for delivering correct services. 
• Reliability refers to system ability to continue with providing correct service.  
• Safety refers to system ability to prevent catastrophic consequences in case of 
system fault or failure. 
• Integrity refers to system ability to prevent improper system alterations. 
• Maintainability refers to system ability to undergo modifications and repairs. 
The first attempts towards security were initiated in ancient times when Caesar sent encrypted 
letters by changing the order of alphabet letters to prevent unauthorized disclosure of military 
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related information to enemies. Accordingly, cryptography and confidentiality protection 
were the first aspects of security that caught attention and led to broad research domains. 
Even though computers started being used in the 1950s, it was only much later in the 1970s 
that researchers started to investigate computer security [3]. Later, other system aspects were 
assigned to security making it a more complex attribute. The most commonly used definition 
for computer security (also network and IT security) was proposed by ITSEC [4] as 
“protection of the computer systems, services, information and the networks connecting them 
from intentional attacks”. Accordingly, security was defined as a combined concept covering 
three main system attributes as described by following. 
• Confidentiality refers to system ability to prevent information from disclosure to 
unauthorized parties. 
• Integrity refers to system ability to prevent unauthorized modification of 
information. 
• Availability refers to system ability to prevent unauthorized withholding of 
information or resources. 
This definition is similar to the ones later proposed by Common Criteria [5] and British code 
of practice [6]. The definition covers the most important system attributes to withstand a 
hostile environment. We believe it is possible to combine security and dependability 
attributes to get a better understanding of system functionality in hostile and normal 
environments. Although the definition for availability and integrity differs between the 
security and dependability concepts, they have the same implication. The difference is that 
dependability is evaluated in the absence of malicious input whereas security is evaluated in 
malicious environments. Moreover, there have been studies on the relationship between 
security and safety in different domains, such as safety-critical systems.  Laprie et al. [1], [2] 
attempted to merge security and dependability concepts in the early 80s, which was followed 
by other attempts with the same goal. In spite of these endeavors there does not exist an 
accepted proposal for a unified concept that encompasses security, safety and dependability.  
As defined by Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge [7], “security risk is any event 
that could result in the compromise of organizational assets… which may adversely affect the 
enterprise. As such, consideration of security risk is a vital component of risk management.”		
In this thesis we consider security as the root for other system composite attributes such as 
risk and dependability. 
It should be noted that the security concept mentioned above considers protection of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability against intentional attacks. However, in order to 
have a more holistic view within this thesis, we introduce inputs provided by users and non-
users. The input provided by users and non-users can be divided into three classes that is 
described as follows.  
• Malicious input: Non-users or malicious users introduce malicious intent to 
make a breach to the system, which could be for various reasons such as 
monetary benefits. 
• Faulty input: Users introduce an unwanted/unintentional faulty input to the 
system, e.g. as a result of a mistake. 
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• Normal input: Users introduce a normal input to the system resulting in a normal 
environment for the system.  
As well explained by Neumann [8, p.130], there are no essential functional differences 
between accidental and intentional threats and they might lead to similar or the same 
consequences. While, the techniques for addressing them might be different, it is often crucial 
for systems to be protected against both kinds of threats highlighting the necessity to 
anticipate both types. In this thesis the malicious input is treated similarly to the faulty input. 
Therefore the intention of the introduced attack in this thesis context is irrelevant. 
According to Oxford English Dictionary the term “risk” is taken from an Arabic word “قزر”, 
the meaning of which is “working in order to gain income and profit” [9]. The English word 
“risk” was first used in 1655 to define “the possibility that something unpleasant 
or unwelcome will happen” [9]. Risk is closely connected with the term “uncertainty” which 
represents lack of reliability of a situation. This characteristic is assumed to be unpleasant as 
it makes it difficult or impossible to be prepared for the consequences. According to ISO 
31000 [10] risk is “the effect of uncertainties on objectives”. Therefore, risk is generally 
investigated to reduce the amount of uncertainty involved in various contexts.  
There exist different contexts and industries where risk plays an important role in product 
development and organization strategies. One of the earliest areas where risk has been 
investigated is automotive industry. According to ISO 26262 [11], which is used in the 
automotive domain, risk is defined to be a product of a probability of occurrence of harm and 
the severity of that harm. Risk assessment in other fields is similar to this approach by 
focusing on identifying the probability of an unwanted event exposure (likelihood) and the 
consequences of such event in case of occurrence (loss).  
1.2	THESIS	CONTEXT	AND	OUTLINE	
This thesis contains work that investigates risk in two different contexts, namely (i) 
information systems and (ii) software development.  
 
In the context of information systems, we take a conceptual and general point of view by 
considering information systems as a whole, leaving its components such as software, 
organization, people, and data aside. In this context, risk is commonly assessed by identifying 
potential threats towards the information system, approximating the probability of attacks 
launched towards the system, and valuing the potential losses due to possible system failures 
[23]. The risk assessment process for information system is categorized into qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, which will be presented in details in Section 2. 
 
In the specific context of software development, we study the development process in more 
detail, making organization and people the components of interest. In this context risk 
constitutes a key player in project planning and initiating phase and cannot merely be 
modeled as a product of probability and consequences of unwanted events. The level of 
uncertainty is high when planning and initiating projects due to a variety of activities and 
roles involved in each phase of the project. We realize that risk management and assessment 
has been a key factor in software development industry for a long time and therefore been 
investigated deeper and in more details in comparison with risk assessment in information 
systems. This could be due to the complexity of assessing information system security risk 
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and lack of data. However, we believe the role of risk assessment is underestimated in 
information system industry in general. Similar to other types of projects, the earlier that risk 
is investigated and addressed the higher the chances are for a successful software 
development project. In the software development context, risk is coupled with initiation and 
planning uncertainties during requirement engineering and design phases. This is presented in 
more detail in Section 2. 
In this thesis, we begin by investigating security and dependability assessment by applying 
black box modeling (meta-conceptual model) for metrication and, using the same model, 
propose a cause and effect approach for risk assessment. We then propose a framework for 
performing risk assessment, specifically focusing on quantitative approaches. Finally, we 
investigate the risk involved in the software development process. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general background 
and research history for information system security and risk assessment, quantification and 
management. Section 3 describes the main problems and questions this thesis addresses and 
summarizes each paper by providing a short list of contributions. Finally, Section 4 concludes 
the thesis by providing a summary of this work and identifying directions for future research. 
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2.	MANAGEMENT	AND	ASSESSMENT	
In a successful business an important requirement is to manage different tasks and processes 
within the organization. As mentioned in the introduction, it is necessary to assess and 
analyze different factors that are involved in the project to perform proper management. As 
the same reasoning applies to information system and security, well-established information 
security and risk assessment is required for a reliable and functional information system. For 
these reasons, we see value in providing a short background on the main concepts 
investigated in this thesis. Additionally, we find it important to acknowledge the significance 
of research history on security and risk management and assessment within the context of 
information systems and project.  
The purpose of this section is to provide a description of the two contexts investigated in this 
thesis, namely information systems and software development. Accordingly, Section 2.1 
focuses on the information systems context, and begins with a general description of 
information system-security management in Section 2.1.1. Then follows a description of 
information system-security assessment and its two different types in Section 2.1.2. The 
process of information system-security risk assessment is explained in more details in Section 
2.1.3, where it is supported by a framework to illustrate key factors and phases of the process. 
The focus of Section 2.2 is the project context, starting with description of the process of 
project management and assessment in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, respectively. This is followed 
by a description of the project risk management process in Section 2.2.3 and software 
development risk management in Section 2.2.4. Finally, we provide a summary in Section 2.3  
2.1	INFORMATION	SYSTEM	CONTEXT	
This section focuses on clarifying the research history and definitions within information 
system and security context. Accordingly, a brief summary of some standards and taxonomies 
of information system security management and assessment are presented. This is followed 
by a more detailed description of information system-security risk assessment process.  
2.1.1	INFORMATION	SYSTEM	SECURITY	MANAGEMENT		
Today’s technology-dependent industries need to analyze, evaluate and treat information as a 
“business issue” as opposed to as a “technical issue” in order to achieve strategic business 
objectives [13]. Within a technology and business context, a management process generally 
refers to ability to coordinate and conduct organizational activities compliant with 
organizations’ policies and procedures to enhance the organization success [12]. 
Similarly, according to Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 
[12], information-security management refers to “the necessary requirements and/or 
obligations to effectively initiate, plan, execute, monitor and control information security 
activities across the organizations in an effort to successfully achieve organizational security 
objectives; and to protect the organization from all potential threats” [12], [13]. 
COBIT [12] and ISO/IEC 17799 [14] are the two common applied frameworks that provide 
guidance for initiating, implementing, maintaining and improving information technology 
security. COBIT has proposed a process-driven framework that includes four main domains 
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being plan and organize; acquire and implement; deliver and support; and monitor and 
evaluate. Moreover, ISO/IEC 17799 proposes security control domain based framework, 
which includes eleven security control domains, such as access control and information 
security incident management. 
2.1.2	INFORMATION	SYSTEM	SECURITY	ASSESSMENT		
Among the many ways to evaluate information systems and computers, one approach is to 
assess how secure and dependable they are. There exist diverse guidelines for performing 
information system security assessment. The Threat, Vulnerability, Risk Assessment (TVRA) 
model proposed by European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) [47], Common 
Criteria [5], and SANS taxonomy of information system audits and assessment [16] are 
examples of such guidelines.  
Some early work was done in the Workshop on Security System, Scoring and Ranking 
(WISSR) in 2001. They defined Information Security* (IS*) as a synonym for “security 
metrics”. More specifically, IS* was defined as “a value selected from a partially ordered set 
by some assessment procedure, that represents and IS-related quality of some object of 
concern. It provides or is used to create a description of, prediction or comparison with some 
degree of confidence” [17]. WISSR suggested that IS* measurements and metrics can be 
organized into three tracks: technical, operational and organizational. Technical metrics are 
used to describe and compare technical objects such as algorithms and architectures. 
Operational metrics are used to describe and manage the risks towards the operational 
environment and the organizational metrics are used to describe and track the effectiveness of 
organizational programs and processes. There exist several taxonomies that propose different 
categories for information system security metrics such as information assurance metrics 
proposed by Vaughn et al. [18], the U.S. National Institute of Information Standards and 
Technology (NIST) security metrics taxonomies: 800-55 [19], 800-26 [20] and information 
assurance metrics taxonomy for IT network assessment proposed by Seddigh et al. [21]. 
However, it is out of the scope of this thesis to give details of taxonomies, their advantages 
and shortcomings. A short summary of different taxonomies and categorizations of security 
metrics is presented by WISSR [17]. 
Depending on the process of data collection and the way results are presented IS* can be 
categorized as qualitative or quantitative metrics. There is a vague distinction between these 
two types and it frequently breaks down in practice. Even WISSR, which introduced the 
security metrication categories, avoids discussing qualitative vs. quantitative measures. 
Although this is a very important topic, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to investigate it in 
detail. However, we touch upon a general description of qualitative and quantitative metrics 
below, followed by our metrics definition proposal.  
Qualitative assessment represents security in a qualitative way such as a high/low/medium 
scale for threats and vulnerabilities proposed by an expert, which is more useful in abstract 
and high-level system assessment.  According to SANS [22] qualitative security assessment 
relies upon three types of individuals being a “(1) facilitator who is familiar with information 
security concepts (2) a manager (from the business side) who is responsible for the data and 
the associated business processes, (the data/process owner) and (3) solution providers who are 
experts familiar with delivering and supporting solutions that protect and support business 
processes.” 
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Quantitative assessment offers more refined information about system security components 
such as a number of threats attacking the system, threat severity, difficulty of an attack, 
system defence strength or plausibility of a vulnerability. Quantitative assessment methods 
are commonly based on mathematical models and probability analysis. In comparison with 
qualitative methods, these methods are more technical oriented, and their target audience are 
therefore typically developers, system engineers and technicians. Quantitative metrics make 
the decision-making process easier by providing numerical values on loss and benefits of 
applying or skipping security controls.  
One example of quantitative metrics is attacker success measure. These measures use a 
privilege graph to assess the following four measures for an insider seeking root privilege: SP 
(shortest path), NP (# of paths), Mean Effort assuming attacker has total memory and Mean 
Effort assuming attacker is memory-less. The goal of these metrics is to improve security 
monitoring and administration [17]. A list of various quantitative metrics, their goals and 
target audience is presented by WISSR [17].  
We choose to make a clear distinction between these two types based on the following 
reasoning. 
We say that IS* functions as a qualitative assessment method if the data for the assessment 
process is collected by qualitative data collection methods such as interviews or surveys, and 
the assessment involves high level of subjectivity such as experts’ judgement. 
In contrast, we say that IS* functions as a quantitative assessment method if the data is 
collected by statistical analysis and/or logs of real data and is used by mathematical models 
such as probabilistic analysis and graphs, therefore leading to an objective or semi-objective 
assessment. 
2.1.3	INFORMATION	SYSTEM	RISK	ASSESSMENT	
Risk Assessment is a process performed in order to assess the risk threatens a system by 
identifying potential threats towards the system. According to Jaisingh et al. [23] the 
assessment is done by: 
• Estimating the likelihood of these threats attacking the system 
• Identifying and ranking the value, sensitivity, and criticality of assets 
• Estimating the potential losses 
• Identifying cost-effective solutions to mitigate the risk.  
As a result, risk assessment is a useful tool for prioritizing security resources in organizations 
[24] and according to SANS [16], it is one of the security assessment process phases. There 
are mainly two approaches to assess risk being qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative risk assessment methods assign relative values to system risk, assets, 
consequences and countermeasures by identifying all the threats towards a system and its 
resources [25], [26]. This is achieved throughout conducting structured interviews, workshops 
and sending out questionnaires to security and system experts [25], [27]. Qualitative methods 
can be used to assess the relationship between threats and vulnerabilities [23]. 
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Quantitative risk assessment methods assign numerical values to the likelihood, impact of 
the risk, and the costs and benefits of applying countermeasures [25]. These methods 
generally consider IS risk as a function of threat likelihood, and the expected loss caused by 
the threats targeting system vulnerabilities, they are also referred to as “expected value 
analyses” [28].  
Figure 1 (taken from Paper C in this thesis) presents the relationship between qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessment and their differences, detailing the risk assessment process with 
regards to its resources, inputs, evaluation methods and outputs.  
 
More details regarding the resources, input and actions are provided Section 3 and Paper C in 
this thesis. Regardless of the type of resources and input data, risk evaluation methods are 
categorized as being risk calculation (referred to as mathematical calculation in the paper) or 
risk classification. As shown in the figure, these two methods can be used in combination. For 
instance, by classifying inputs the risk classification approaches provide risk measure in terms 
of scale, and could be used as an input to risk calculation methods where the scales are 
transferred to numbers and vice versa.  
2.2	PROJECT	CONTEXT	
This section focuses on the research history and definitions within the project context. In 
general the overall process of project management is similar in most contexts. However, as 
previously discussed, activities and definitions may differ depending on the context where 
management and assessment is performed. 
2.2.1	PROJECT	MANAGEMENT		
There are various definitions for project management and its phases/activities depending on 
the domain where the project is conducted. The first international standard on project 
management was delivered in 2012 by ISO 21500 [29]. In 1996 the Project Management 
Institute (PMI) proposed the PMBOK guide [30], one of the most common definitions for 
project management. The PMBOK guide proposes guidelines for management of individual 
projects, and also defines project management related concepts, life cycle and its related 
processes. According to the PMBOK guide, project management activities can be categorized 
as follows. 
Initiating: Activities that are performed to obtain authorization to start a new project or a new 
phase of an existing project.  
Figure	1,	A	Framework	for	Information	System	Risk	Assessment	
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Planning: Activities that are performed to identify and define the scope of the project, the 
objectives, and the course of actions in order to achieve the project objectives. 
Executing: Activities that are performed to meet the project specifications that are defined in 
the project management plan.  
Monitoring and Controlling: Activities that are performed to review the progress and 
performance of the project; identify areas that a change of plan is required; and introduce the 
required changes in those areas. 
Closing: Activities that are performed to formally close the project by finalizing all the 
process group activities. 
2.2.2	PROJECT	ASSESSMENT	
According to Davis [31] an assessment process is defined as a “systematic determination of 
the results of an effort or intervention”. This process is assumed to enhance continuous 
improvement of project components. More specifically, project assessment is a process of 
investigating the project performance and deliverables, with a goal of identifying issues that 
cause deviation from the project plan defined in the initiation phase of project management to 
keep the project on track so as to maximize value for money and time invested in the project. 
One example of project assessment activities (shown in [32]) is as follows. 
 
Clarify goals in measurable terms: Activities that are performed to translate the objectives 
and goals defined in the planning phase of project management process into measureable 
variables.  
 
Develop strategies to measure the progress or outcomes: Activities that are performed to 
define representative indicators for project progress, success or failure. It is of value to 
identify key factors that affect the type of outcome the project leads to.  
 
Identify the data required: Activities that are performed to gather all the information and 
data required for conducting analysis in order to evaluate the progress of the project or its 
outcomes. 
 
Analyze data: Activities that are performed to analyze the collected data by considering the 
project plan and the measures that are enhanced by different sources such as statistical 
analysis, etc. 
 
Improvement of the system: Activities that are performed to modify and improve the project 
outcome and progress by taking the results of the data analysis activities into account, which 
highlight the areas of project that need improvement. 
2.2.3	PROJECT	RISK	MANAGEMENT	
Disregarding contexts and roles, any action or decision taken by an individual introduces an 
unavoidable level of uncertainty and risk. In order to have a higher chance of making 
appropriate decisions, different sources of risk and uncertainty should be identified and 
addressed. By doing so, business managers, system designers and engineers will be assured 
that risk is either reduced by taking preventive actions such as applying security mechanisms 
	 	 		 12	
	
or is monitored and maintained at an acceptable level. If risk is not managed, the company or 
the individuals will face consequences ranging from human lives and injuries to monetary or 
trust loss. Therefore risk management is a critical process, which should be performed 
precisely according to standards and guidelines.  
In this thesis, we apply a risk management process definition proposed by NIST 800-39 [33] 
and NIST 800-30[34], where risk management processes include the following phases, (i) 
framing risk; (ii) assessing risk; (iii) responding to risk; and (iv) monitoring risk. Bellow we 
summarize each phase and its purposes.  
The first phase establishes a risk context by describing the environment in which risk-based 
decisions are made. This activity enhances the organization to develop a strategy to assess 
risk, respond to risk and monitor risk [34].  
The second phase addresses how organizations assess risk within the context of the 
organizational risk strategy set in the previous phase. The purpose is to identify threats to 
organizations, vulnerabilities internal and external to organizations, the harm; and the 
likelihood that harm will occur. This process results in a determination of risk, which 
typically is a function of the degree of harm and likelihood of harm occurring. 
The third phase addresses how organizations respond to the risk that is determined by the risk 
assessment process. The purpose of this phase is to provide a consistent, organization-wide 
response to risk that is compatible with the organization risk strategy.  
The fourth phase addresses how organizations monitor risk over time. The purpose of the 
risk-monitoring component is to determine the effectiveness and the implementation of risk 
responses; and satisfaction of information security requirements. 
2.2.4	SOFTWARE	DEVELOPMENT	RISK	MANAGEMENT		
Failure to understand and resolve project risks can lead to a significant financial loss and even 
project failure, making it difficult for organizations to achieve their business objectives [35]. 
An example of such risky projects is software development. The reports on software projects’ 
success statistics [36-38] indicate that as many as 9% [37] to 11.5% [36] of the projects are 
abandoned, aborted or cancelled. As software development failures put organizations at risk 
of substantial economic loss, it is critical for managers, stakeholders and developers to find 
solutions for prediction, assessment and management of undesirable situations that lead to 
failure in software development process. We refer to this process as software development 
risk management, where risk is “a particular aspect or property of software development task, 
process or environment, which, if it is ignored, will increase the likelihood of failure” [39]. 
As mentioned earlier one of the important phases of risk management is to respond to risk. 
Risk assessment and analysis lead to efficient risk response strategies that can obtain investor 
confidence [40]. Hall [41] introduced several risk response strategies, namely acceptance, 
avoidance, research, reduction and transfer [40]. For industry risk reduction is of particular 
interest as it can be achieved by risk mitigation, prevention or anticipation. Consequently, risk 
mitigation is one of the common approaches for evaluating and managing risk involved in 
different processes such as software development process.  
 
 
	 	 		 13	
	
2.3	SUMMARY		
In this section we have given a brief description on the two main topics addressed by this 
thesis, namely security assessment and risk assessment. Because these topics vary in 
terminologies depending on context and setting, we have provided two separate in-depth 
overviews: one on security and risk assessment in the context of information systems, and one 
on risk assessment in the context of software development process. Moreover, we have shown 
there are similarities in the assessment process of security and risk, which leads to similar 
type of measures (qualitative and quantitative).  
By reviewing research history in the field of information system security and risk assessment 
it becomes clear that there is a lack of practical and general approaches that could support 
managers and business owners with economic decisions. Such decisions could be about 
whether to invest on specific security functions or whether to perform thorough risk proofing 
for handling consequences of failure or fault occurrence at the organization or information 
system level. It is our belief that there is a tight connection between the management aspect of 
security/risk, and the more technical aspects of security/risk. As the concept of project 
management has been around long before management of information systems, we identify a 
need for researching both security and risk attributes from a management and information 
system perspective. We recognize management of the software development process as being 
a good case study as it involves assessment at management level as well as technical level. 
For this reason, we have chosen to highlight the process of risk management performed 
during development of software from two perspectives: the management perspective 
investigates each management phase while the technical perspective investigates each phase 
of the software development lifecycle. To that end, this thesis constitutes a summary of our 
research in security/risk assessment in information systems in general and the software 
development process in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	
	 	 		 14	
	
	 	
	 	 		 15	
	
3.	GENERAL	PROBLEM	STATEMENT	AND	SUMMARY	OF	RESEARCH	
CONTRIBUTIONS	  
The main objective of this thesis is to provide insights into the understanding of the security 
and risk assessment process performed within the two settings we mentioned in previous 
section namely, information systems and software development. Our work begins by 
introducing a model-based security-quantification approach for information systems. 
Applying the introduced model from the first paper in risk-assessment context, a modified 
version of one of the commonly used risk-analysis methods is proposed. One of our findings 
is that there seems to be a lack of clear exhibition of details in the risk assessment process. 
We therefore provide a framework/taxonomy that describes such details by categorization of 
key factors in the assessment process and provide a classification of risk-calculation methods. 
We also observe that security/risk assessment have major effects in making decisions by 
managers, and consequently believe that it is worth investigating these attributes from a 
management perspective as well. Moreover, we identify the software development process to 
be a good case as it involves both management and technical perspectives. Accordingly, we 
study the risk-management process within the process of agile and plan-driven development 
of software. Below we give a short description of each paper in terms of what research 
questions it addresses and what scientific contributions it makes. 
The objective of the first paper (Paper A) is to provide a structured way for assessment and 
metrication of operational security.  The paper contributes to the security metrication field by 
categorizing security metrics into two categories namely, protective and behavioral metrics. 
The paper considers integrity, a protective metric, as the most important aspect of security, 
and proposes a categorization of integrity metrics to system-related and threat-related 
metrics.  
The objective of the second paper (Paper B) is to propose an approach for improving security 
risk calculation and analysis. The paper proposes an approach for improving reliability of one 
of the common risk-calculation methods by taking system operational factors into account. 
The paper introduces a measure called probability of propagation, which accounts for system 
operation, attack chain of impairment, and introduces a latency factor when calculating the 
probability of an undesirable event. 
The objective of the third paper (Paper C) is to identify key players in the risk assessment 
process and their relationship. The paper proposes an abstract model or taxonomy of the risk 
assessment process with the goal of clarifying different phases involved in the assessment 
process. The contribution of this paper could be used as a base for development and 
investigation of new risk assessment methods.  
The objective of the fourth paper (Paper D) is to investigate different strategies for risk 
management among various software development processes, primarily focusing on agile and 
plan-driven processes.  The paper aims at validating the common belief of improved risk 
mitigation in agile development processes by conducting a Systematic Literature Review 
(SLR) on risk management through assessment of journal publications in the fields of 
software engineering, project, and risk management. The results can lead to well-established 
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decisions by developers and managers regarding the choice of a proper development model 
with better risk mitigation. 
To summarize, the papers provided in this thesis are connected as follows: Paper A provides 
the base for Paper B by proposing a model-based security-assessment approach, which later 
in Paper B is applied to security-risk calculation. Moreover, while investigating risk 
assessment in Paper B, we realize a lack of clarity in information system-security risk- 
assessment process, which lead to our proposed framework in Paper C. In Paper C we 
investigate security-risk assessment in details, which clarifies a lack of practical and general 
approaches that can be applied by managers when faced with economic decisions. This leads 
to our investigation of the risk assessment presented in Paper D, which encompasses both 
management and technical perspectives of risk assessment.  
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3.1	PAPER	A:	A	FRAMEWORK	FOR	SECURITY	METRICS	BASED	ON	OPERATIONAL	SYSTEM	
ATTRIBUTES	
There exist different approaches that measure specific attributes of security and 
dependability. However, to our knowledge, not many approaches exist that investigate the 
relation between such attributes and how they affect each other. Such information is valuable 
for designing more cost efficient, secure and reliable systems by guiding the designers to 
focus on the most important security and dependability attributes. Our work aims to simplify 
different measures of security and dependability, clarify their relation and propose a model to 
enhance development of new measurement methods. The main question Paper A addresses is 
which security and dependability attributes can be used to conduct operational system 
quantification? 
	Furthermore, Paper A addresses the following questions:	
• Is it possible to categorize operational security and dependability attributes based on 
their interaction with the system and environment? 
• What is the relationship among these attributes? 
• Is it possible to categorize different approaches that measure integrity? 
Paper A is based on a conceptual (black box) model of a system and its interaction with the 
environment [45]. The model highlights the system detailed attributes, behavior, inputs and 
outputs to enhance metrication of dependability and security of the system of interest.  It 
should be noted that the paper does not propose new attributes, but categorizes the existing 
ones based on the proposed conceptual model.  
The contributions of Paper Aare as follows.  
We categorize system operational security and dependability attributes as being either 
protective or behavioral. This categorization is based on the interaction of the system with the 
environment, its inputs, behavior and outputs. Protective attributes represent the system 
interaction with the input from the environment regardless of whether it is malicious or not. 
Behavioral attributes represent the system response to the input. This response could be 
delivery or denial of information or service, which is dependent on system attributes, and 
internal defense mechanisms such as recovery mechanisms.  
We identify security and dependability attributes that can serve as metrics to quantify 
system operation in terms of protective and behavioral aspects. Identified protective attributes 
metrics are integrity (protecting the system from malicious input) and accessibility 
(possibility of accessing the system by authenticated users). Identified behavioral metrics are 
confidentiality (secrecy of information), exclusivity (secrecy of services), availability 
(readiness for correct service), reliability (full delivery or degraded delivery of service), and 
safety (absence of catastrophic failures).  
We identify the relationship among protective and behavioral attributes based on system 
interaction with its environment. One important finding is that behavioral attributes are 
dependent on the protective ones. For instance, confidentiality and reliability of a system is 
dependent on integrity and accessibility of the system. This means the better the integrity and 
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accessibility are; the higher the chances are for a better confidentiality and/or reliability. As 
accessibility is a metric commonly used for normal input, it is possible to consider integrity as 
an essential aspect of security and dependability. This would help the designers to spend more 
time and money on improvement of integrity, which in turn would lead to a more secure 
system. 
We categorize system integrity measurements as either being system-related or threat-
related. System-related approaches measure integrity in terms of the system’s ability to 
protect itself against malicious input. This could be calculated by for example measuring the 
combined strength of all involved security defense mechanisms, which are threat reduction, 
boundary protection and recovery. The threat-related approaches measure integrity in terms 
of the amount of effort an attacker has to expend in order to make an intrusion. The amount of 
effort could be calculated by assessing the attackers’ skill level and the time spent for making 
an intrusion into a system. This categorization of integrity measurement approaches could 
help the designers to generate more structured approaches to test and metricate system 
security and dependability.  
To summarize, Paper A investigates operational security and dependability metrics. The 
paper proposes a model-based approach to enhance categorization of operational security by 
taking environmental factors and system attributes into consideration.  
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3.2	PAPER	B:	A	CAUSE	AND	EFFECT	APPROACH	TOWARDS	RISK	EVALUATION	
In most approaches for system evaluation, risk assessment is a function of specific factors, 
such as threats and vulnerabilities. What is lacking in these methods is that they do not 
consider the probabilistic influence on risk from (1) system operation, (2) internal 
mechanisms and (3) the chain of system impairments. Indeed, other authors have suggested 
more refined risk analysis methods, such as probabilistic distribution among successful 
attacks [42] or calculating the effect of aggregating different tasks in a complex business 
process [43]. However, to our knowledge none of them has adopted a full input-output causal 
approach. The causal approach takes the system attributes and attack chain of impairments 
into account, improving the reliability of the probability calculation. One possible reason why 
this has previously not been done is that the probabilistic analysis becomes more complicated 
when considering the factors mentioned above. Our work presents a risk evaluation method 
that is more abstract and holistic than many other risk analysis methods that calculate risk.  
The main question Paper B addresses is how can the effect of system operation on the final 
security risk be calculated? Furthermore, Paper B investigates how to calculate risk when a 
threat leads to different types of system output. 
Paper B proposes an improved version of commonly applied basic risk assessment formula, 
where risk is calculated based on probability of an unwanted event and the possible 
consequences of those events [44], [48]. Paper B is based on a previously proposed 
conceptual security and dependability model [45], which was also used in Paper A, in order to 
assess operational system security risk. The model enhances the probabilistic analysis by 
considering a so-called causal chain of impairments.  
The contributions of Paper B are as follows. 
We propose a risk assessment method that provides a clear explanation of the key factors in 
risk calculation, namely system operation, attack chain of impairment, and latency factor. 
The impacts of these factors are evaluated in terms of how they influence on system behavior 
and, in particular, system failure risk.  
We suggest a new metric for calculating the risk probability called probability of 
propagation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply the effects of the 
factors mentioned above and their impairments in risk calculation. Moreover, we propose a 
metric called sum over probability of propagation and the related loss. The purpose of this 
metric is to enhance capturing the different causal chains of impairment for a specific threat 
that leads to different types of outcomes. This is achieved by calculating each outcome with 
their respective probability of propagation and the consequences, so as to add up to a 
composite risk assessment.  
To summarize, Paper B investigates operational security risk assessment. A novel factor, 
probability of propagation, is proposed to incorporate effects of system operation and chain 
of impairments into probability calculation of unwanted security events leading to some type 
of system failure.  
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3.3	PAPER	C:	AN	ATTEMPT	TO	STRUCTURE	RISK	ASSESSMENT		
Risk assessment is mainly used to identify threats and consequences of successful attacks and 
to prioritize the use of security resources in organizations [46]. There exist quite a number of 
risk assessment methods most of which focus on threat identification, vulnerability and asset 
assessment, probability and consequence calculation and final risk classification. Despite the 
existence of various risk assessment approaches, to our knowledge, certain matters remain 
unclear, for example type of information sources and data used for risk assessment, type of 
risk evaluation method and type of risk assessment process outputs. Our work makes an 
attempt to clarify these aspects. The main question Paper C addresses is if it is possible to 
categorize the risk assessment process with respect to the process inputs, internal 
evaluation methods and outputs.   
 Accordingly, Paper C addresses the following questions: 
• What are the types of resources required for this process and what type of actions are 
performed on them?  
• What are the types of risk assessment inputs? 
• What are different types of risk evaluation methods? 
• What are different types of risk assessment outputs?  
Paper C attempts to identify the main factors that play critical roles in risk assessment 
processes, how they are related to each other and what their effect is on the final risk. Thus, 
we put forward a structure/taxonomy attempting to clarify the uncertainties mentioned above 
as well as assessing the pros and cons of existing risk assessment methods. Further, we 
believe that this structure could provide a solid base towards development of new risk 
assessment methods.  
The contributions of Paper C are as follows. 
We categorize resources applied in risk assessment based on whether they are related to 
system, organization and the environment or related to experts. The first category refers to 
resources that can be applied to extract raw data required for the risk assessment process, 
such as logs of system vulnerabilities or summary of threats within a specific period. The 
experts category refers to resources that perform assessment and measurement over the first 
category and provide processed data, such as probability of launching an attack towards the 
system by an attacker. 
We categorize risk assessment input as being deterministic, objective or subjective. The 
categorization is based on the type of resource and whether the action performed on resource 
is extraction, measurement or assessment. Deterministic inputs are produced by the mere 
extraction of data. In contrast, objective and subjective inputs are produced by measurement 
and assessment of data respectively.  
We categorize risk evaluation methods as being risk calculation (mathematical calculation) 
or risk classification. The first category uses strict mathematical formulas and equations to 
calculate the risk. The second category classifies risk based on expert assessment of risk 
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parameters. We categorize risk calculation methods using approaches from different 
application domains.  
• Cost benefit analysis uses either monetary gain (benefit) or monetary loss (cost) to 
assess risk.  
• Game theory uses probability and consequences of different attack and defence 
scenarios taken by the players, and their utility functions to assess risk. 
• Probabilistic risk assessment uses a 10-step process to identify initiating unwanted 
events that enhances modeling of different scenarios and their relevant system 
failures in terms of likelihood and severity.  
• Uncertainty modeling uses three approaches being fuzzy, Monte Carlo or Analytical 
Hierarch Process to calculate the cognitive uncertainty factor involved in the risk 
assessment process.  
• Supplementary approaches such as Markov modeling or matrix-based approaches 
that are commonly used in combination with other mathematical calculation methods 
to enhance probability and consequence calculation.  
We categorize risk assessment outputs to qualitative and quantitative representation of risk. 
The qualitative outputs describe risk in terms of scales and words. However, quantitative 
outputs represent risk by numbers assigned to risk. 
To summarize, Paper C investigates the process of information system risk assessment. The 
paper proposes an outline for enhancement of the risk assessment process by clarifying 
different phases of the assessment process, types of inputs and outputs of these phases and 
different types of risk evaluation methods.  
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3.4	PAPER	D:	SYSTEMATIC	LITERATURE	REVIEW	ON	RISK	MANAGEMENT	IN	PLAN-
DRIVEN	AND	AGILE	SOFTWARE	DEVELOPMENT	
It is commonly believed that companies in the software development industry assume that 
risk management and mitigation is better in projects that adopt agile processes than in 
projects where plan-driven processes are adopted. An explanation for this could be that risk 
mitigation and resolution is performed earlier in agile process. However, the validity of this 
belief has never been thoroughly investigated. To investigate whether this is indeed the case, 
there is a need to compile existing research and practices on risk management. Our work 
contributes to this through a systematic literature review (SLR) that summarizes existing 
empirical evidence on risk management collected from journal publications in the fields of 
software engineering, project management and risk management. The main question Paper D 
addresses is if risk mitigation is affected by the choice of the development process.   
The review was conducted in the fields of software engineering, project management and risk 
management. Using a set of rigorous inclusion and exclusion criteria, 78 primary studies were 
selected.  
The contributions of paper D are as follows. 
We show that there exist no publications that report a difference in risk mitigation between 
agile and traditional development approaches. This is surprising given the common belief. 
We identify a broad set of application domains that are investigated by the existing research 
as being defense, financial sector, information systems, medical industry, telecom, space, 
Enterprise Resource Planning and automation. Among this broad set of domains only three 
(defense, financial sector and information systems) are addressed by more than two primary 
studies.  
We categorize the research methods as being empirical or non-empirical.  The empirical 
research methods found are case study, survey, controlled experiment and action research.  
The non-empirical research methods found are design of models and theoretical research 
methods. We found that the most applied research method is design of models, being 
addressed by as many as 49 primary studies.  
We identify the types of risk investigated in research being perceived or actual risk. We find 
that the most common type of risk is perceived risk being addressed by 41 primary studies. 
We have also identified Requirement analysis phase and planning phase being the most 
addressed development and management phases, addressed by 18 and 23 primary studies 
respectively. 
To conclude, the major findings of this review is that there is lack of clarity regarding 
application domains among research papers in this filed. 62 out of 78 studies did not have 
clear descriptions of neither the domains where the study was performed in nor the domain it 
could be applicable to. This is essential to be addressed to enable academics to investigate the 
generality of a domain specific model in other domains, and providing guidelines for industry 
when adopting domain-specific models or methods. 
There is lack of validity and limitation investigations among research papers in this filed. 
Although, more than half of the primary studies (49 publications) are categorized as design of 
models, limitations and threats to validity of proposed models are only addressed by 19 
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publications. Accordingly, 30 out of 49 publications have no validity check leading to low 
rank for these publications when assessed by our quality assessment system.   
There is also lack of clarity regarding the development models. Among 78 primary studies, 
66% did not have clear descriptions of the development models. Although we did not limit 
our SLR to any specific models, this could have led to missing more than half of the primary 
studies. Accordingly, it is hard to review the literature regarding trends in any specific 
development models. 
There is lack of quantitative risk assessment studies in this filed. By conducting this review, 
we found out not many quantitative empirical studies have been performed in different 
domains. However, these studied could lead to valuable data beneficial for academics and 
industry. 
Furthermore, there is lack of general SLRs among research papers in this filed. To the best of 
our knowledge, the existing SLRs have thorough inclusion/exclusion of criteria focused on 
very specific aspects of software engineering and/or risk management such as global software 
development or eXtreme programming. Therefore, we believe there is a need to highlight a 
demand for empirical research on risk management applied in different development models 
and domains. 
Finally, there is lack of empirical investigations of the superiority of agile process with regard 
to risk mitigation among research papers in this filed. Even if this assumption is true, we 
neither found any empirical evidence proving better risk mitigation in agile processes, nor 
any papers investigating the possible gap between risk mitigation in agile and plan-driven 
approaches. 
To summarize, Paper D investigates software development risk management. The paper 
investigates a software development process with respect to the development lifecycle phases 
among different software development models specifically agile and plan driven. Moreover, 
the paper treats a software development process as a project and investigates the management 
phases of this project.  
The results of this review encourage further empirical investigation of risk management in 
different software development models. Studies like the one performed provide a 
classification of models, their advantages, and challenges enabling software project managers 
to make decisions that would improve companies’ return on investment and reduce the 
number of abandoned or failed software development projects. 
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4.	CONCLUSION		
In today's IT industry a business is as successful as its security and risk management. The 
more complex the IT solutions are the harder it is to figure out which parts of the system are 
more prone to failure in terms of service due to security vulnerabilities. On a daily basis 
managers need to make economic decisions about actions that must be taken in order to keep 
the business running without spending too much time and money. Accordingly, these 
decisions need to be taken based on information provided by the technical divisions of the 
company. In most cases it is not an easy task to translate technical information to a relevant 
management question; therefore, there is a need for a common language, or factor, that both 
parties can connect to. We believe that factor is risk. More specifically, we believe that a 
terminology for risk can be adopted both by security experts, to assess the probability of a 
threat attacking a system vulnerability will cause a system failure, as well as by managers, to 
assess how probable it is that a project will exceed the budget or deadline. 
 
This thesis comprises a study of operational security and risk assessment in information 
systems in general, taking a black box approach. To that end, the thesis presents an 
investigation of risk assessment and management in a more special setting, namely the 
software development process. However, as this thesis addresses different features of 
information systems, it also attempts to clarify different terminologies within the two 
contexts. 
 
Our work begins by investigating dependability and security attributes by applying a 
preexisting back box model of system operation to categorize and identify metrics that 
provide a good insight into system security and dependability. One finding from Paper A is 
that the system operation and defense mechanisms have a significant effect on the system 
output. Based on this, we decide to apply this concept in security risk-calculation by 
proposing a possible improvement taking system chain of impairments into account in Paper 
B. While investigating security risk calculation and assessment, we review proposed 
qualitative and quantitative approaches and find that they are not relevant to apply, as they do 
not have a clear view of the parameters they used for the assessment process. This leads to the 
proposed taxonomy that is presented in Paper C. As we realize that risk assessment is a young 
field within the area of information-system security, we also investigate this process within an 
older field, namely software development. The results from a systematic literature review 
investigating risk assessment in software development are presented in Paper D. 
Below we summarize the main results presented in this thesis and highlight the contributions 
of this research. 
4.1	SUMMARY	OF	RESULTS	AND	CONTRIBUTIONS	
The main research result of this thesis is that it highlights the lack of clarity and consistency 
regarding definitions and terminologies, by providing an insight towards the understanding of 
the security and risk assessment process performed within two important settings, namely 
information systems and software development. To that end, the thesis proposes a 
categorization of a set of attributes to be applied as metrics for quantifying operational system 
security. Moreover, by highlighting system operation and internal mechanisms effect on 
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system output, the thesis proposes a new metric for calculating risk probability. Further, the 
thesis proposes a structure that clarifies the resources, inputs, evaluation method and outputs 
involved in qualitative and quantitative risk assessment process. Finally, to provide a wider 
view the thesis investigates how risk is assessed and managed in a bigger setting, in the 
context of software development. 
 
This thesis makes some detailed contributions, which we believe puts the focus on some 
research questions and areas that have not been thoroughly investigated. We conclude this 
thesis by summarizing these contributions. 
 
• Proposing a model-based approach that enhances categorization of operational 
security by taking environmental factors and system attributes into consideration. 
 
• Identifying system operational security and dependability attributes as being either 
protective or behavioral. 
 
• Identifying integrity and accessibility as protective attributes metrics. 
 
• Identifying confidentiality, exclusivity, availability, reliability, and safety as 
behavioral attributes metrics. 
 
• Identifying that behavioral attributes are dependent on the protective ones. 
 
• Proposing that integrity should be the main system operation attribute that is required 
to be measured. 
 
• Proposing that system integrity measurements can be categorized as being either 
being system-related or threat-related. 
 
• Proposing a novel factor to incorporate effects of system operation and chain of 
impairments into probability calculation while assessing security risk. 
 
• Proposing an outline to enhance the risk assessment process by identifying the phases 
of the process. 
 
• Proposing a categorization for resources, inputs, evaluation methods and outputs of 
the risk assessment process. 
 
• Proposing a categorization for different types of risk calculation methods. 
 
• Highlighting research performed on risk assessment from a project management and 
software development perspective. 
 
• Clarifying that there is no evidence published regarding improvement of risk 
mitigation and management in agile development, which hopefully will enable 
software project managers to make more informed decisions that would increase the 
amount of successful software development projects. 
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• Proposing a categorization of research methods as being empirical or non-empirical 
and the types of risk investigated in research being perceived or actual risk. 
4.2	FINAL	COMMENTS	
We believe this thesis highlights the connection among different measures namely, security, 
dependability and risk within three contexts and research fields namely information system 
security, software development and project management. This could lead to adaption of new 
or currently existing approaches for measurement, mitigation, or handling of risk and security 
from one filed to another. One example of this adaption was presented by this thesis where 
the same model for security metrication was applied to show the effect of system operation on 
probability calculation while assessing risk. This highlights the connection between the two 
fields of risk and security measurement in Information systems. Another example this thesis 
highlighted is where software development risk is addressed from a project perspective where 
risk in requirement engineering was identified to be tightly connected to risk involved in 
planning and initiation phase of project management. Therefore, similar approaches that are 
applied for mitigation of risk in early phases of project cycle can be applied for risk in 
requirement engineering.  
We believe the results show that there is a need for further investigation of different types of 
risk, and their calculation and management approaches within common fields such as 
information system, project management, and cognitive behavior psychology. 
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